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Recent Decisions
of 1343(3) jurisdiction. Therefore, it seems the Court did in fact fail
to properly support its blanket statement that it had "never" invoked
a personal-property distinction.
The Lynch decision is perhaps erroneous in the underlying considerations of the formulation of the Hague distinction. The Court was
perhaps presumptuous in distinguishing Household Finance's precedent
as to a personal-property distinction. But, given the general policy,
seemingly pursued by the Court, on an expanded federal forum for an
expanded segment of the populus in the area of civil rights, Lynch is
indeed understandable.
Larry D. Yogel
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PORTUNITY TO BE HEARD PRIOR TO REVOKING HIS PAROLE-The United
States Supreme Court has held that a parolee's liberty involves significant values within the protection of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and termination of that liberty requires an
informal hearing to give assurance that the finding of a parole violation is based on verified facts to support the revocation.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Petitioners Morrissey and Booher were each convicted of forgery and
sentenced to a term in an Iowa penitentiary. Over a year later each was
released on parole. Approximately six months after their release, at
their parole officers' discretion, each was arrested for parole violations
and confined in a local jail. At the end of the following week, solely
on the basis of a written report by their parole officers, the Iowa Board
of Parole revoked their parole and the petitioners were returned to the
penitentiary. At no time during any of the proceedings which led to
the parole revocations were the petitioners granted any type of hearing.
After exhausting state remedies, both petitioners filed habeas corpus
petitions in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa alleging that they had been denied due process because their
paroles had been revoked without a hearing. The district court held
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on the basis of controlling authority that the state's failure to accord
a hearing prior to parole revocation was not a violation of due process.'
Their appeals were consolidated in the court of appeals which in each
case affirmed the decision of the district court by a four to three vote
holding that due process did notrequire a hearing.2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
question whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires that a state afford an individual some opportunity to be
heard prior to revoking his parole. 3
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, began with the
proposition that because parole arises after the end of the criminal
prosecution, including imposition of sentence, the full panoply of
rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole
revocations. 4 Stating this, the Court turned to the question of what
requirements of due process, if any, do in fact apply to parole revocations. In deciding this question the Court examined the nature of
the interest of the parolee in his continued liberty, as well as the
interest of the state and society in parole revocation.
In discussing the nature of the interest of the parolee the Court
stated that it rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon
whether a governmental benefit'is characterized as a "right" or a'
"privilege." 5 Whether any procedural protections are due depends on
the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss," 6 and whether the nature of the interest involved is one within
the contemplation of the "liberty or property" -language of the fourteenth amendment. 7 The Court stated that the liberty of a parolee
enables him to engage in a wide range of activities open to persons
1. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443. F.2d 942, 943 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2. 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971).
3. 404 U.S. 999 (1971). This question.. had arisen many times in the lower courts
throughout the country because many of the states were required by their statutes to
provide some type of hearing, while others were bound by no legal requirement to grant
a hearing of any kind. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 n.15 (1972).
4. Id. at 480 (emphasis added)..
5. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (held that state statutes which deny
welfare benefits to resident aliens or to aliens. who have not resided in the United States
for a required number of years are violative of the equal protection clause).
6. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (held, that
the due process clause of the fifth amendment barred the federal government from designating organizations as Communist on a list disseminated for the purpose of aiding loyalty
investigations of government employees, without first affording them notice and the opportunity to be heard).
7. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67. (1972) (held that due process required that a
person be afforded a hearing prior to the taking of his chattels under the replevin statutes
of the states involved).
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who have never been convicted of any crime. He can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and form the other
enduring attachments of normal life. The liberty of a parolee, although conditional, includes many of. the core values of unqualified
liberty and its revocation inflicts a "grievous loss" on the parolee.9
Whether a parolee's liberty is a "right" or a "privilege" it is valuable
and within the contemplation and protection of the "liberty or property" language of the fourteenth amendment. 10 Its termination calls
for some process, however informal.
In deciding what process is due, the Court stated that society, as
well as the parolee, has an interest in not having parole revoked erroneously or arbitrarily because the fair treatment of the parolee will
increase the chances of his rehabilitation and restoration to a normal
and useful life within the law by the avoidance of any unfavorable
reactions on his part to arbitrariness." In contrast to this the Court
found that the state has no interest in revoking parole without some
informal procedural guarantees. A simple factual hearing would not
be an undue burden on the administration of parole and would not
interfere with the exercise of discretion by the state parole board.
Balancing these interests, the Court concluded that due process requires that a parolee be given, prior to the revocation of his parole,
an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole
violation will be based on verified facts, and that the exercise of discretion by the parole board will be informed by accurate knowledge of
2
the parolee's behavior.1
In the past, the denial of the rights of procedural due process to a
parolee facing the termination of his conditional freedom had been
most commonly based on the right-privilege distinction. The United
States Supreme Court held in Ughbanks v. Armstrong"3 that parole
was not a constitutional right but rather a "present" from the state
to the prisoner.' 4 This characterization of the grant of parole as an
act of grace resulted in the status of the conditional liberty of the
parolee being considered a privilege and not a right.' 5 Where it had
8. 408 U.S. at 482.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 484.
12. Id.
13. 208 U.S. 481 (1908).
14. Id. at 487-88.
15. See Hiatt v. Campagna, 340 U.S. 880 (1950) (affirmed the lower court's decision
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been possible to characterize the private interest involved as a mere
privilege, it had been traditionally held that the procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing did not have to be met in
order to revoke the privilege. 16 Therefore, the conditional liberty
of the parolee was surrounded by no procedural protections in regard
to its revocation other than those provided by the state through its
legislature. 17 It was not protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Today, however, the right-privilege distinction no longer enjoys
vitality.'6 The leading case regarding the demise of the right-privilege
distinction is Goldberg v. Kelly 9 which held that welfare payments
could not be terminated in accordance with due process unless the
recipient was afforded an evidentiary hearing prior to their termination. 20 In its reasoning in Goldberg the Court stated that the question
whether due process applied in this situation could no longer be
answered by arguing that public assistance benefits are a "privilege"
and not a "right." Rather, there should be an examination of the
nature of the individual's interest involved to determine if it falls
within the protection of the due process clause.21 If it does, then the
individual's interest and the harm that might result, of being deprived
of his means of support, must be balanced against any governmental
22
interest in summary revocation.
The main thrust of the Court's decision in Morrissey is its recognition of the demise of the right-privilege distinction and its application
of the rationale used in Goldberg for parole revocations. The Court in
Goldberg found that public assistance payments, which are a statutory
entitlement to persons qualified to receive them, are within the protection of procedural due process and cannot be revoked without a
prior evidentiary hearing because the immediacy of the desperation of
a welfare recipient who has been denied his payments outweighs any
governmental interest in summary revocation. 23 Logically, the Court
which held that parole was a matter of legislative grace and not a right, and that the
legislature could affix such conditions and provide such administration as it saw fit).
16. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
17. At the present time thirty states require that the parolee should receive some type
of hearing in parole revocation. 408 U.S. at 488-89 n.15.
18. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).

19. 397 US. 254 (1970).
20.
21.
22.
23.
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in Morrissey could reach the same result in applying this rationale to
parole revocation. Both cases involve the termination of statutorily
authorized benefits, one dealing with welfare payments and the other
with conditional liberty. Furthermore, the immediacy of the desperation of a welfare recipient who is denied payments is no greater than
the desperation of a parolee who is being denied his freedom. 24 Since
the burden of an evidentiary hearing is no greater in parole revocation
than it is in revocation of welfare payments, it follows logically that
if due process requires a hearing prior to revocation of welfare payments, it should also require a hearing prior to parole revocation.
Hyser v. Reed,25 which was decided before Goldberg ended the
right-privilege distinction, seems to be an intermediate step between
denial of an evidentiary hearing in parole revocation and the decision
in Morrissey. In Hyser the court held that even though a parolee was
not entitled to a hearing prior to the revocation of his parole, he was
entitled to a preliminary interview before a person designated by the
parole board.2 6 The court reasoned that the entire statutory scheme
of parole and the formalizing of revocation procedures show that Congress intended, and the parole board undertook to establish, a retaking
process based on concepts of basic fairness.27 It noted that the revocation of parole can have serious consequences to individuals, and, therefore, the revocation process should live up to certain minimal notions
of fairness.28 In doing this the court cloaked the preliminary interview
in constitutional standards of basic fairness and opened the door to the
application in parole revocation of constitutional due process under the
fourteenth amendment. 29 The idea of a preliminary interview found
in Hyser seems to have been a stepping stone from requiring no hearing of any kind to the decision in Morrissey.
There have also been developments in the collateral area of probation which seem to have led the Court in Morrissey to reach its decision. In the past, the dicta in Escoe v. Zerbst3° was used to deny
24. Cf. Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970) (stated that the immediacy of the
desperation of a welfare recipient is no greater than the desperation of a probationer who
is being denied his freedom).
25. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
26. Id. at 243. It should be noted that this preliminary interview was not an innovation by the court, but rather, was required in federal parole revocations in the Parole
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1970).

27.
28,
29.
30.

318 F.2d at 243. The court examined the Parole Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-10 (1970).
318 F.2d at 243.
Id. at 243-44.
295 U.S. 490 (1935). The Court held that the probationer was entitled to a hearing

697

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 11: 693, 1973

probationers a hearing prior to revocation of their probation. Justice
Cardozo stated in his opinion that probationers did not have a constitutional right to a hearing because probation was conferred upon
them as a privilege and not a right.8 1 However, the Court in Mempa
v. Rhay32 held that a lawyer must be afforded to the probationer at
the revocation proceedings as a matter of federal constitutional law
because certain legal rights might be lost if not exercised at this
stage. 83 This seems to imply that if there is a constitutional right to a
lawyer there is also a constitutional right to the hearing.
One recent case in this area is Hahn v. Burke8 4 which held that the
probationer is eititled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the revocation of his probation, under the due process clause of the fourteenth
8 5 The court based
amendment.
its decision on the demise of the
right-privilege distinction and applied the rationale used in Goldberg.36 The court reasoned that the immediacy of the desperation of a
welfare recipient who is denied payments is no greater than the desperation of a probationer who is being denied his freedom. 3 7 Weighing
the extent to which petitioner may be condemned to suffer "grievous
loss"' 8 against the governmental interest in summary adjudication the
court found the petitioner's loss of freedom to outweigh the added
state burden of providing a limited hearing.39 This decision seems to
be an exact forerunner of the decision in Morrissey. It follows logically
that the Hahn requirement of a prior hearing should be extended to
parole revocation because of the similarities between revocation of
probation and parole. Both involve a possible loss of freedom and both
.require a factual determination of the commission of
conduct not
40
conviction.
involved in the original criminal
The decision in Morrissey may be taken one step further in the
future. This extension would be that a parolee is entitled to this inprior to revocation of his probation. Its decision, however, was based on a statute requiring a hearing and not on any constitutional requirement.
31. Id. at 492. This is the same rationale that had been used to. deny a parolee a
hearing. See Hiatt v. Campagna, 340 U.S. 880 (1950).
32. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
33. Id. at 135.
34. 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970).
35. Id. at 103.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 104.
38. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
39. 430 F.2d at 104.
40. Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42
U. CoLo. L. Rav. 197, 205 (1970).
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formal evidentiary hearing prior to. his retaking and return to a local
jail or prison. This idea appeared in the dissent of Judge Skelly Wright
in Hyser v. Reed. He stated that if the alleged parole violations are not
serious, such as the commission of a crime, there is no reason for not
granting a parolee a hearing prior to his incarceration. 41 Also, in In re
Tucker,4 2 the dissent said ".

.

. the parole revocation hearing should

occur prior to the incarceration of the parolee who is charged with
technical parole violations not constituting criminal conduct. ' 43
The rationale of these opinions seem to be the avoidance of the
unnecessary harm to a parolee who is taken into custody, given a hearing at which time he proves his innocence regarding any of the alleged
parole violations, and then is permitted to return to society. The harm
is that he will have lost his job; his status in the community, and the
other benefits of conditional liberty without good reason. 44 The state
and society have no interest to balance against the harm to the parolee
unless the alleged violation involves criminal conduct, thereby constituting a danger of possible harm to the community if the parolee. is
permitted to maintain his freedom.4 5 This idea of providing the parole
revocation hearing prior to the incarceration of the parolee also ap4
pears in the dissent of Justice Douglas in Morrissey."
A hearing prior to the retaking, with the exception for alleged
violations criminal in nature, seems to be the next logical step that
the Court is likely to take. Applying the rationale of Morrissey to the
question of whether the hearing should occur prior to the, retaking,
we find the nature of the parolee's interest in-his conditional liberty
remains the same. And, provided no commission of criminal conduct
is alleged, this*interest seems to outweigh any interest of the state in
retaking without a hearing. 47 The logical extension, however, may not
be the proper extension.
The decision reached in Morrissey was predictable. Based on the
demise of the right-privilege distinction, the adoption of the balancing
41. 318 F.2d 225, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
42. 5 Cal. 3d 171, 486 P.2d 657, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
43. Id. at 196, 486 P.2d at 676, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
44. Id. at 203, 486 P.2d at 678, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
45. Id. Since the parolee has already allegedly committed one crime while on parole,
the possibility of his committing another crime is good, thus constituting a danger to
society.
46. 408 U.S. at 497 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
47. The interest of the state in retaking a parolee not charged with committing a new
criminal offense, without a hearing, appears to be no greater than its interest in revoking
parole without any hearing. The burden of the hearing would be no greater and there is
no greater interference with the exercise of discretion by the parole board.
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test used in Goldberg, and the recent development in the area of probation, it would have been illogical for the Court to have reached another
decision in Morrissey. If the revocation of welfare payments is within
the procedural protections of due process, it seems justifiable that the
revocation of conditional liberty also should be protected. The possible
harm to the parolee appears to be just as serious as the possible harm
to the welfare recipient. Had the Court held that a parolee was not
entitled to a hearing, it would have been giving the revocation of
monetary benefits greater protection than the revocation of freedom
or liberty. This would have been difficult to justify.
However, the Court must be careful in maintaining a distinction
between the conditional liberty of a parolee and the absolute freedom
of a citizen never convicted of a crime. It must be kept in mind that
the parolee has already been convicted in accordance with the requirements of due process. The revocation of any conditional liberty which
is granted after the initial conviction should not entitle him to receive,
once again, the full panoply of rights which he has already received at
his initial conviction. To do this would be to equate conditional
liberty with absolute liberty. If, in the future, the Court follows the
logical extension of its rationale and holds that a parolee is entitled to
a hearing prior to his retaking, it will have crossed the line of distinction between conditional and absolute freedom. The conditional liberty will be granted a protection that even the absolute liberty does
not enjoy. A parolee would be entitled to a hearing before he could
be incarcerated, whereas, an ordinary citizen could be confined in a
jail, if there were probable cause to believe he had committed a crime,
without any hearing at all. Both involve the loss of freedom, and there
would seem to be little justification for such a preferential treatment
of conditional liberty.
Vincent M. Dadamo
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